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Are Universities Patent Trolls?
Mark A. Lemley*
ABSTRACT
Hold-up is a primary component of patent litigation and patent
licensing today. Universities are engaged in an unprecedented
surge in patenting. At the confluence of these seemingly unrelated
developments is a growing frustration on the part of industry with
the role of universities as patent owners. Time and again, when I
talk to people in a variety of industries, their view is that
universities are the new patent trolls.
In this article, I argue that universities should take a broader
view of their role in technology transfer. University technology
transfer ought to have as its goal maximizing the social impact of
technology, not merely maximizing the university’s licensing
revenue. Sometimes those goals will coincide with the university’s
short-term financial interests.
Sometimes universities will
maximize the impact of an invention on society by granting
exclusive licenses for substantial revenue to a company that will
A PDF version of this article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2732. Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete
Journal archive.
*
© 2008 Mark A. Lemley, William H. Neukom Professor of Law, Stanford Law School;
of counsel, Keker & Van Nest LLP. I am particularly grateful to a large number of
people who read this and gave me comments, even though simply asking the question is
anathema to many of them. In particular, thanks are due to David Adelman, Ann Arvin,
Robert Barr, Linda Chao, Maggie Chon, Michael Cleare, Peter Detkin, Rochelle
Dreyfuss, Brett Frischmann, Carl Gulbrandsen, Rose Hagan, Joel Kirschbaum, Kathy Ku,
Gary Loeb, Mike Mireles, Lita Nelsen, Alan Paau, Arti Rai, David Simon, and Janna
Tom, and to participants in conferences at Washington University School of Law and the
Licensing Executives Society/Association of University Technology Managers joint
meeting for comments on this topic. Not only don’t they necessarily agree with what I’ve
said, in many cases I’m sure they don’t. This is an edited transcript of a speech, and
reads like it.
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take the invention and commercialize it. Sometimes, but not
always. At other times a non-exclusive license, particularly on a
basic enabling technology, will ultimately maximize the
invention’s impact on society by allowing a large number of
people to commercialize in different areas, to try out different
things and see if they work, and the like. University policies might
be made more nuanced than simply a choice between exclusive
and non-exclusive licenses. For example, they might grant fieldspecific exclusivity, or exclusivity only for a limited term, or
exclusivity only for commercial sales while exempting research,
and they might condition continued exclusivity on achievement of
certain dissemination goals. Particularly in the software context,
there are many circumstances in which the social impact of
technology transfer is maximized either by the university not
patenting at all or by granting licenses to those patents on a
royalty-free basis to all comers.
Finally, I think we can learn something about the raging debate
over who is a patent troll and what to do about trolls by looking at
university patents. Universities are non-practicing entities. They
share some characteristics with trolls, at least if the term is broadly
defined, but they are not trolls. Asking what distinguishes
universities from trolls can actually help us figure out what
concerns us about trolls. What we ought to do is abandon the
search for a group of individual companies to define as bad actors.
In my view, troll is as troll does. Universities will sometimes be
bad actors. So will non-manufacturing patent owners. So will
manufacturing patent owners. Instead of singling out bad actors,
we should focus on the bad acts and the laws that make them
possible.
I. COMPLAINTS ABOUT UNIVERSITY PATENTS
The confluence of two significant developments in modern
patent practice leads me to write a paper with such a provocative
title.1
1

no.

So I don’t give anyone a coronary, the general answer to the question in my title is
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A. The Rise of Patent Hold-up
The first development is the rise of hold-up as a primary
component of patent litigation and patent licensing. You can call
this the troll problem if you like.2 I prefer to think of it as the holdup problem. But whatever we call the problem, it seems quite
clear that more and more patent litigation is being filed, and
significant money is being made, by non-manufacturing entities—
entities that don’t themselves actually make the product and in
many cases don’t actually engage in developing the technology
very far at all. Many of these entities also engage in tactics that
allow them to lay low and then take a mature industry by surprise
once participants in the industry have made irreversible
investments.3 The hold-up or troll problem is particularly
significant in component-driven industries, notably information
technology (“IT”), where the problem is compounded by the fact
that a product developer such as Intel that must aggregate
thousands of different inventions into its semiconductor chip is
vulnerable to hold-up by any one of the thousands of inventors.
Patent owners in those component industries can capture far more
than the intrinsic value of their invention, because under longstanding patent law4 patent owners have had the right not just to
sue and get paid the percentage of the value contributed by their
invention but to enjoin the sale of Intel’s entire chip until it can
design a new chip that avoids infringing that patent, something that
might take years and require investing billions of dollars in a new
fab.5 These factors have combined to produce the growth industry
of the new millennium: patent hold-up. Hundreds of companies
2

The term “patent troll” was coined in the late 1990s by Peter Detkin, then assistant
general counsel at Intel, to refer to patent owners who hide under bridges they did not
build to pop out and demand money from surprised passers-by. I’ll talk about some
definitions of “patent troll” at the end of this Article.
3
For discussions of this problem, see, for example, Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to
Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not To), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 149
(2007) [hereinafter Lemley, Ten Things]; Mark R. Patterson, Inventions, Industry
Standards, and Intellectual Property, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1043, 1048–51 (2002).
4
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 281, 283–84 (2007).
5
On this problem and how it leads to settlements well in excess of the intrinsic value
of the patent, see Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking,
85 TEX. L. REV. 2163, 2172–73 (2007); Carl Shapiro, A Model of Patent Bargaining With
Holdup (2006) (working paper, on file with author).
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are engaging in efforts to capture not just the value of what they
contributed to an invention, but also a disproportionate share of
somebody else’s product.
B. The Rise of University Patenting
The second development in the last three decades is the
massive surge in university patenting.6 Universities obtained
sixteen times as many patents in 2004 as in 1980,7 and universities
had 100 times as many technology transfer offices.8 In significant
measure this is a result of the Bayh-Dole Act,9 which not only
permits but encourages university patenting of federally-funded
inventions. But it is also a reflection of the growth in importance
of patents more generally. Those university patents don’t sit
dormant; universities license them to companies for over $1 billion
a year in revenue.10 Patents are now a significant contributor to
some university bottom lines. And importantly, more and more
university patents are patents on the very earliest stages of
technology. It is universities, perhaps not surprisingly given their
role in basic research, who are patenting the basic building blocks
in new technologies. We see this with particular force in

6

For a discussion of the growth of university patenting and its potential risks, see
DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITYINDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT 4 (2004);
John R. Allison et al., University Software Ownership: Trends, Determinants, Issues
(2005) (working paper, on file with author); Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven
Research and University Technology Transfer, in UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 93 (Gary D.
Libecap ed., 2005).
7
Before 1980, universities worldwide obtained about 250 U.S. patents a year. In
2003, they obtained 3,933 patents, an almost sixteen-fold increase. See Bernard Wysocki
Jr., College Try: Columbia’s Pursuit of Patent Riches Angers Companies, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 21, 2004, at A1.
8
Lorelai Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress: Are Universities Adding to the
Cost?, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1373, 1412 (2007) (“There were only 25 active technologytransfer offices in the United States at the time the Bayh-Dole Act was passed. By the
twenty-fifth anniversary of the Act, there were 3300.”) (internal citations omitted).
9
35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2000).
10
See Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, University Licensing and the Bayh-Dole
Act, 301 SCI. 1052, 1052 (2003); The Big Ten: Universities That Made the Most
Licensing Dollars Last Year, IP L. & BUS., Jan. 5, 2005, at 14 (estimating $1 billion in
2004); Wysocki, supra note 7, at A1, A12 (estimating $1.3 billion per year).
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nanotechnology, an area I have studied in detail.11 Universities,
which account for 1% of patents on average across all fields,
account for 12% of all patents in nanotechnology, and more than
two-thirds of what I identify as the basic building block patents in
nanotechnology.12 The other area in which university patents are
significant is biotechnology, where they represent about 18% of all
patents.13 As a result, universities have met a much bigger role in
patenting than they ever have before.
C. Are Universities Engaged in Hold-up?
At the confluence of these developments is a growing
frustration on the part of industry with the role of universities as
patent owners. Time and again, when I talk to people in a variety
of industries, their view is that universities are the new patent
trolls. One even referred publicly to universities as “crack addicts”
driven by “small-minded tech transfer offices” addicted to patent
royalties.14
Why such a vehement reaction? One important reason is that
universities are non-manufacturing entities. They don’t sell
products. I don’t think that necessarily means they’re bad actors.
But it does mean that their incentives in dealing with the patent
system align in many ways with those of private-sector patent
licensing shops. One of the assumptions corporations in patentintensive industries (such as IT or increasingly biotechnology)
make about patenting is symmetry: that if a competitor sues you
for infringement you can sue them back. That symmetry deters
much patent litigation in the industries in which it operates.15 But
11

Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601 (2005)
[hereinafter Lemley, Nanotechnology].
12
Id. at 616, 616 tbl.2.
13
See David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The Mismeasure of
Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1677, 1687 & n.44 (2007)
(noting that in 1994 university and government patenting “accounted for twenty percent
[of biotechnology patents] and has remained at that level ever since”).
14
Chuck Fish, Comments at the Fordham Annual Conference on International
Intellectual Property Law & Policy (Apr. 22, 2006).
15
See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 474 (2004)
(finding that semiconductor patents are litigated only 1/3 as often as other patents, and
offering the symmetry of relationships as an explanation). To be sure, other factors, such
as industry concentration and large patent portfolios, may play a significant role in
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that symmetry doesn’t often exist for non-manufacturing entities.
Universities aren’t going to trade their patents away in exchange
for a cross-license, because they don’t need a license to other
people’s patent rights.16 Instead, they want money. And to an IT
general counsel who deals with dozens of threats of suit every
year, any patent owner in that position looks an awful lot like a
patent troll. In short, there’s definitely a sense among industry
representatives that universities are greedy when it comes to
licensing patents.17
Compounding the perception of greed is that university patent
licensing offices have strong institutional incentives to grant
exclusive rather than non-exclusive licenses, for various reasons.
First, exclusive licensing royalty rates are almost always higher
than non-exclusive rates. That’s not surprising, since the licensee
is getting more from an exclusive license than from a nonexclusive license. From the perspective of a technology transfer
office focused on this quarter’s bottom line, that higher royalty rate
is hard to turn down. Second, the companies with which they are
negotiating often want exclusivity.18 They are especially likely to
get it if the company in question is a faculty-organized startup.19
Finally, exclusive licensees often pay the cost of patent
prosecution, a relatively small savings but an immediate one that

causing disputes in this industry to be resolved without litigation. See Gideon
Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 63–64 (2005).
16
Theoretically, universities could be sued for infringement, but they aren’t—there is
only one reported decision involving an infringement suit against a university between
1983 and 2004. See Tao Huang, The Experimental Purpose Doctrine and Biomedical
Research, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 97, 111–12 & tbl.1 (2004). There may
be other cases that settle before decision, however. For reasons universities aren’t sued,
see Elizabeth A. Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do
Universities Deserve Special Treatment?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 942–44 (2006).
17
A surprising dissenting view suggests that universities are overly cautious in
licensing intellectual property. See Kristen Osenga, Rembrandts in the Research Lab:
Why Universities Should Take a Lesson from Big Business to Increase Innovation, 59
ME. L. REV. 407, 408–11 (2007). I don’t believe that either the data (which show an
enormous increase in both patenting and licensing by universities) or the experiences of
those I’ve talked to support this characterization.
18
See, e.g., William J. Holstein, Putting Bright Ideas to Work Off Campus, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 5, 2006, § 3, at 11 (“Companies, on the other hand, want exclusive licenses.”)
(quoting William R. Brody, president of Johns Hopkins University).
19
de Larena, supra note 8, at 1415 (referring to “tacit favoritism” of such companies).
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impacts the technology transfer office’s bottom line. The result is
that the overwhelming majority of university patent licenses are
exclusive. The Association of University Technology Managers
(“AUTM”) reports that more than 60% of its members’ 2005
licenses were exclusive.20 In the nanotech licenses I studied (just a
few dozen, admittedly), between 95 and 100% of the university
licenses granted were exclusive.21
One example from the
biotechnology field of an exclusive license to an enabling
technology is the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation’s
(“WARF”) field-exclusive license to Geron of all stem cell patents,
granted shortly before those stem cell patents became
extraordinarily valuable because the Bush administration
obstructed the development of new stem cell lines.22
In fact, however, this higher royalty rate may or may not
translate into a higher revenue stream for the university. Whether
it does, depends on the nature of the technology being licensed.
For certain basic building blocks—what I call “enabling
technologies”—opening up licensing to many innovators who can
develop different uses will generate substantial improvements,
while giving an exclusive license to only one person will generate
fewer improvements.23 And exclusive licenses can block any

20
AUTM U.S. Licensing Survey, FY 2005, http://www.autm.net/events/File/
US_LS_05Final(1).pdf.
21
Lemley, Nanotechnology, supra note 11, at 627 (citing ETC GROUP, NANOTECH’S
“SECOND NATURE” PATENTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GLOBAL SOUTH 14 (June 2005),
http://www.etcgroup.org/documents/Com8788SpecialPNanoMar-Jun05ENG.pdf
(last
visited Jan. 2, 2008)). See also Allison et al., supra note 6, § 5 (discussing exclusive
licenses of software patents by universities).
22
See, e.g., Amy Rachel Davis, Patented Embryonic Stem Cells: The Quintessential
“Essential Facility”?, 94 GEO. L.J. 205, 210 n.21 (2005); Ryan Fujikawa, Federal
Funding of Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research: An Institutional Examination, 78 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1075–60 (2005). Those patents are now under reexamination at the
Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), however, and WARF has significantly eased its
licensing restrictions, particularly for academic research. For a discussion, see Antonio
Regalado & David P. Hamilton, How a University’s Patents May Limit Stem-Cell
Research, WALL ST. J., July 18, 2006, at B1.
23
I have made this argument in detail elsewhere, see for example Mark A. Lemley, The
Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997),
and I won’t repeat it here.
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development of a technology if the licensee doesn’t deliver.24
Even if in the long run non-exclusive licensing of many
technologies actually increases university revenue, in the short run
a university tech-transfer office seeking to maximize the amount of
money that the office generates will tend to grant exclusive
licenses. Exclusive licenses aren’t necessarily bad—a point I
discuss below—but they raise concerns about the effective
diffusion of new technologies.
A final reason for industry concern about university patenting
is that universities are increasingly enforcing their patents. Recent
years have seen high-profile cases litigated to judgment by the
University of California, the University of Rochester, Harvard,
MIT, Columbia, Stanford, and suits filed by many other
universities. One notable example is Eolas Technologies, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp.,25 in which the University of California licensed a
software patent to a company that really does look like a patent
troll, however you want to define that term, and then shared with
that company a jury award of $520.6 million against Microsoft.26
Universities, recognizing patent licensing and litigation as an
important revenue source in the modern environment, have been
active in politics, largely in alignment with the life sciences
industries (from which most university patent revenue comes), in
opposing most of the effective pieces of draft patent reform
legislation. Universities helped argue for eliminating from the
2005 patent reform bill any restrictions on both injunctive relief

24
Rochelle Dreyfuss relates the story of Johns Hopkins’ ill-fated exclusive license to
Baxter for a patent that Baxter didn’t use. See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Unique Works/Unique
Challenges at the Intellectual Property/Competition Law Interface 5 (N.Y.U. Sch. of
Law Ctr. for Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 05-12, 2005),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=763688. The exclusivity
of the license prevented CellPro, which independently developed a commercial use for
the invention, from licensing it from the university. See id.
25
399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
26
Id. at 1332. A more recent high-profile case involved the Harvard-MIT patent
successfully enforced against Eli Lilly for $65 million. See Brian Kladko, Ariad, research
institutes win patent-infringement case against Eli Lilly, BOSTON BUS. J., May 4, 2006,
available at http://boston.bizjournals.com/boston/stories/2006/05/01/daily48.html. For
documenting of other cases, see Allison et al., supra note 6, § 5; Rowe, supra note 16, at
936–37.
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and continuation applications. The patent reform bill27 also faced
attacks from some universities seeking to eliminate the move to
first inventor to file, which doesn’t benefit them because they tend
to file later than commercial entities, and eliminate the creation of
prior user rights, which also don’t benefit them since they aren’t
generally using the inventions. These university preferences
should not be surprising, at least if we view the university as a
profit-maximizing entity rather than one concerned with the social
good. Like other non-manufacturing entities, after all, universities
are first and foremost intellectual property (“IP”) owners, not IP
licensees.
The result is a felt sense among a lot of people that universities
are not good actors in the patent system. Given the difficulty
anyone has had in defining a patent troll, it is easy to move from
that conclusion to the idea that universities are trolls too. I think it
is worth questioning that leap. There is something going on here,
but I’m not sure that it is reasonable to equate university patents
with private troll behavior. The common refrain in complaints
about patent trolls is that they are not contributing anything to
society, but rather obtaining and asserting patents covering
technology independently developed by defendants. The question
remaining to be answered is whether the same is true of university
patents. In other words, it’s worth asking whether society needs or
wants university patents at all.
II. DO WE NEED UNIVERSITY PATENTS?
From the perspective of the university, one justification for
university patents may be to fund universities. More money is
better than less money, and the billion dollars each year in
licensing is a substantial new revenue source for universities, most
of which goes to research, and some of which goes to education. If
you think research and education are under-funded in our society
today, as I tend to believe, generating that additional revenue
27

The “Coalition Draft” of the Patent Reform Act, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005) (as
modified by Congressman Lamar Smith of Texas on Sept. 1, 2005) was the specific
target of these attacks, but they are just as relevant to the legislative debate in the 110th
Congress.
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sounds useful in a way that paying for-profit licensing shops
doesn’t. But the additional revenue is not costless: it is money
that comes out of industry pockets, and at least some of it would
otherwise have gone to industry research and development, or to
selling better products, or to providing products more cheaply. So,
it is worth thinking about the costs of patents as a pure wealthtransfer mechanism. Most economists would agree that if our goal
is to adequately fund higher education, patent litigation is an
inefficient way of doing so.28 Further, some argue that a culture of
patenting imposes costs on the university or on academic research
more generally.29 University scientists focused on patenting may
delay or even forego publication in favor of IP protection.30 And
there is substantial literature on how the shift to university
patenting has actually moved universities away from basic research
and towards more applied research in ways that are arguably bad
for society in the long run.31 The risk is not so much that
individual professors will change their research habits as that the
departments that grow will be ones that generate money, and that
the new faculty hiring slots will go to those who engage in
revenue-generating applied research. Of course, government and
private foundation grants can come with conditions attached, and
28

A general tax is a cheaper method of wealth transfer than specific assessments. See,
e.g., ALAN J. AUERBACH & LAWRENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, DYNAMIC FISCAL POLICY 55–87
(1987).
29
See generally JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY, INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION
OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2005).
30
See generally MOWERY ET AL., supra note 6, at 9–34; Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J.
177 (1987). Margo Bagley has documented this problem, and in the hopes of eliminating
it, proposed giving university inventors more time to file patent applications after
publishing articles. Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights:
Putting Patents in Their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 217 (2006).
31
Pierre Azoulay et al., The Impact of Academic Patenting on the Rate, Quality, and
Direction of (Public) Research, (NBER Working Paper No. 11917, 2006), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11917; Brett M. Frischmann, Commercializing University
Research Systems in Economic Perspective: A View From the Demand Side, in 16
UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, at 155, 176–78; Eisenberg, supra note 30, at 177;
MOWERY ET AL., supra note 6, at 9–34; Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole
Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2003); see
generally Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and
the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999).
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can also direct research to particular ends, so in practice they aren’t
perfect funding mechanisms either.
Why else might society need university patents? The classic
justification for patents—creating incentives to innovate—
arguably isn’t nearly as important in the university context as in
the private sector. I think it unlikely that university scientists
would not do research or invent in the absence of patent protection.
There are plenty of other incentives for university scientists to
engage in research, including curiosity, academic prestige, and
tenure and promotion. Further, university inventors are generally
funded by grants or departmental revenue, must assign their rights
to the university,32 and don’t necessarily see any tangible benefit
from university patenting of their inventions. Now, this doesn’t
necessarily mean that patents have no additional effect. It may be
that patents generate some revenue which is refunded to the
researcher’s department and supports further research, and even
that the prospect of that additional funding motivates some
research. But the contribution of patents to university incentives to
innovate seems smaller than in profit-driven companies.
The final reason we might want university patents—and the
argument that actually prevailed in the congressional debates over
Bayh-Dole—is the commercialization argument. Unlike the
classic incentive story, commercialization theory argues that it is
not so much the act of invention, but instead the act of turning that
invention into a marketable product that requires investment and
therefore the exclusion of competition.33 According to this theory,
university inventions will languish and not be commercialized
unless we give someone (initially the university, but presumably
eventually a private company to which the right is licensed or
transferred) control over the invention, and therefore incentive to
invest in developing and marketing it. This argument seems
32

See generally CORYNNE MCSHERRY, WHO OWNS ACADEMIC WORK?: BATTLING FOR
CONTROL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 144–89 (2001).
33
See generally John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI.
L. REV. 439 (2004); F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property
Rights and the Norms of Science—A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV.
691 (2001); Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265 (1977); Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent
Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1065 (2007).
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particularly strong with respect to university inventions, since we
can reasonably expect those inventions involve more basic
research, and therefore to be made at an earlier stage, than private
inventions.
There is some debate as to whether the commercialization
theory is actually true of university inventions. Mowery, Nelson,
Sampat, and Ziedonis suggest that Bayh-Dole was based on
concerns that were misstated, or at least overstated.34 They argue
that there was a good deal of technology transfer without
university patents in the decades before Bayh-Dole, and that even
today there is plenty of university technology transfer that occurs
in the absence of patents.35 By contrast, the prevailing wisdom
seems to be that university patents increase commercialization, and
therefore that Bayh-Dole has been a success.36 Certainly they
increase commercialization deals between universities and
companies,37 though it is hard to know the extent to which that
simply reflects the fact that once a patent issues, the company in
question needs a license in order to commercialize the technology.
My own view is that the validity of commercialization theory
depends a great deal on the industry in question and the particular
34
MOWERY ET AL., supra note 6, at 85–97. See also Michael S. Mireles, Jr., States as
Innovation System Laboratories: California, Patents, and Stem Cell Technology, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1133, 1136 (2006) (describing Bayh-Dole as “one of the most
controversial pieces of intellectual property law related legislation”).
35
Id. at 99–148. Inferential empirical evidence for this is provided by Daniel
Elfenbein, who shows that the majority of technologies developed at Harvard are licensed
before the grant of patent rights, and often without a patent application. Daniel W.
Elfenbein, Publications, Patents, and the Market for University Inventions, 63 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 688, tbls. 1, 6, 8 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=739227;
see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (1996)
(discussing ways in which patents do and do not promote commercialization of university
research). One of the leading objections to university patenting comes from Strandburg,
supra note 6.
36
See, e.g., WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT: THE
BAYH-DOLE ACT: SELECTED ISSUES IN PATENT POLICY AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF
TECHNOLOGY (2006), available at http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/07
Jan/RL32076.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2007); Chester G. Moore, Killing the Bayh-Dole
Act’s Golden Goose, 8 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 151, 155–57 (2006). For an
analysis of both the benefits and costs, see Thomas J. Siepmann, The Global Exportation
of the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act, 30 U. DAYTON L. REV. 236, 229–38 (2004).
37
See Elfenbein, supra note 35, at 690.
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nature of the technology. In the pharmaceutical and biotechnology
industries, where coming up with an invention is only the first step
down a very long road of regulatory process that can take hundreds
of millions of dollars and several years, the commercialization
argument makes some sense. The university generally isn’t going
to seek regulatory approval, and arguably we need to give
somebody exclusive rights to induce them to make the regulatory
investments that the university itself isn’t going to make. We give
the right to the university, but we do so expecting that they will
transfer or exclusively license that right to a private company that
will recoup the hundreds of millions of dollars they spend in
clinical trials, product development, and marketing.38 Other
industries might also have a long post-invention development cycle
and therefore be good candidates for commercialization theory.
That might be true of basic building block technologies like
nanotechnology, where we expect a very long road between the
development
of
the
invention
and
the
ultimate
commercialization,39 though it is likely too early to say for sure
how nanotech will develop. In these industries, Bayh-Dole is
probably a good thing.
On the other hand, I’m doubtful that central control is
necessary to produce commercialization in the majority of other
industries.40 Bear in mind that the commercialization story is at
base anti-market: it assumes, contrary to centuries of economic
38

Interestingly, though, even industry players in the pharmaceutical industry
sometimes lament university reliance on exclusive licensing. See Siepmann, supra note
35, at 236–37 (quoting Joshua Kalkstein, corporate counsel for Pfizer).
39
Lemley, Nanotechnology, supra note 11, at 628–29.
40
Empirical evidence supports the conclusion that patenting reduces rather than
increases technology diffusion overall. Murray and Stern find that patenting is associated
with reduced citation to an academic publication associated with the patent. Fiona
Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow of
Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W11465, 2005), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=755701.
Were commercialization
theory true, it should be the opposite. And Rosell and Agrawal find that university
inventions are diffusing less widely over time, not more widely. Carlos Rosell & Ajay
Agrawal, University Patenting: Estimating the Diminishing Breadth of Knowledge
Diffusion and Consumption (Oct. 2006) (working paper), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12640. Again, were commercialization theory true, it
should be the opposite.
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learning, that ordinary profit motives will not produce efficient
allocation of resources and that we need to vest exclusive control
of a technology or market in one actor in order to get that efficient
allocation.41 Even if we think that’s true in the pharmaceutical or
biotechnology industries because of the regulatory barriers to entry
in those markets, we should not conclude exclusivity is always or
even generally required to encourage a company to bring a product
to market.42 In the IT industries, and even in industries like
medical devices, there is no reason to believe that exclusive rights
are necessary to encourage commercialization of the technology.
It is true even in those industries that when an inventor has gotten
to the point where she can patent something, there may still be
development and marketing work to be done. But we get plenty of
both in a competitive marketplace because the companies who
engage in product development and marketing can reap enough of
the benefits of that investment to make it worthwhile. And indeed
we have seen an enormous number of technologies
commercialized out of universities throughout the 20th Century
without need of university patents. Think of the computer, the
world wide web, search engines, relational databases, and any
number of software programs.43
The need for university patents, in short, depends critically on
the technology at issue. I think much of the industry frustration
with the role of university patents stems from the failure of some
university technology transfer offices to recognize and adapt to
these technology differences. As noted above, technology transfer
offices have strong incentives to maximize revenue from patent
licensing. To achieve this, they have adopted the life sciences
41

See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 147 (2004) [hereinafter Lemley, Ex Ante].
42
More and more property rights scholars seem to forget the benefits of a market
economy. I have heard academics suggest, for instance, that we may not get efficient
entry of Indian restaurants into particular neighborhoods unless we grant some sort of
regional exclusivity. Maybe that’s right, but I doubt it. The market has worked pretty
well in the past, and we should be reluctant to forego its benefits unless we’re quite sure
that the alternative will be better.
43
For a detailed discussion of one example, Apache, see Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah,
Shaping Code, 18 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 319, 394–96 (2005). “The Apache Software
Foundation provides support for the Apache community of open-source software
projects.” http://www.apache.org (last visited Jan. 12, 2008).

LEMLEY_022508_FINAL

2008]

2/25/2008 7:22:20 PM

ARE UNIVERSITIES PATENT TROLLS?

625

model, where exclusive rights and patents seem to make sense
because of the regulatory delays, as their general approach to
patent licensing. But they are increasingly using it in software and
other information technologies.44 The result is frustration on the
part of industry counterparts in industries like computers or
telecommunications that are more interested in freedom to operate
than in exclusive rights over a new technology. It may also be
frustration on the part of tech transfer offices; less than 1% of all
university patent licenses generate over $1 million in revenue.45
And efforts to commercialize the rest is what leads to a lot of the
more worrisome patent licenses in cases like Eolas.46
III. LESSONS FROM THE UNIVERSITY PATENT EXPERIENCE
A. Towards an Enlightened University Patent Policy
Universities should take a broader view of their role in
technology transfer. University technology transfer ought to have
as its goal maximizing the social impact of technology, not merely
maximizing the university’s licensing revenue.47 A university is
more than just a private for-profit entity. It is a public-regarding
institution that should be advancing the development and spread of
knowledge and the beneficial use of that knowledge.48 Sometimes
those goals will coincide with the university’s short-term financial
interests. Sometimes universities will maximize the impact of an
invention on society by granting exclusive licenses for substantial
revenue to a company that will take the invention and
44

See Allison et al., supra note 6, § 1 (documenting the growth in university software
patenting).
45
See Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, University Licensing and the Bayh-Dole
Act, 301 SCI. 1052, 1052 (2003) (0.56%).
46
Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 457 F.3d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
47
For a similar view, see Robert E. Litan et al., Commercializing University
Inventions: A Better Way (Apr. 2007) (working paper, Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research),
available at http://www.kauffman.org/pdf/NBER_0407.pdf.
Osenga, by contrast,
suggests that universities should act more like private businesses in licensing their
patents, paying more attention to the short-run bottom line. Osenga, supra note 17, at 2.
Again, I disagree.
48
Certainly that is the role universities claim for themselves in their mission
statements.
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commercialize it. Sometimes, but not always. At other times a
non-exclusive license, particularly on a basic enabling technology,
will ultimately maximize the invention’s impact on society by
allowing a large number of people to commercialize in different
areas, to try out different things and see if they work, and the
like.49 Universities can still earn revenue from nonexclusive
licenses, and for enabling technologies they might even maximize
their revenue in the long term by granting nonexclusive rather than
exclusive licenses.50
University policies might be made more nuanced than simply a
choice between exclusive and nonexclusive licenses. For example,
they might grant field-specific exclusivity, or exclusivity only for a
limited term, or exclusivity only for commercial sales while
exempting research,51 and they might condition continued
exclusivity on achievement of certain dissemination goals.52
Finally, particularly in the software context, there are many
circumstances in which the social impact of technology transfer is
maximized either by the university not patenting at all or by
granting licenses to those patents on a royalty-free basis to all
49

See Lemley, Nanotechnology, supra note 11, at 627–45; Ted Sabety,
Nanotechnology Innovation and the Patent Thicket: Which IP Policies Promote Growth?,
15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 477, 510–12 (2005).
50
The key university patents on enabling technologies in biotechnology, issued to
Cohen and Boyer for the creation of chimeric organisms and to Axel for methods of
inserting genes into a cell, were licensed nonexclusively because of then-existing NIH
requirements. See Wysocki, supra note 7, at A1. They made enormous sums of money
for Stanford, the University of California, and Columbia, arguably because, not in spite
of, the nonexclusivity of the licenses. See Sally Smith Hughes, Making Dollars Out of
DNA: The First Major Patent in Biotechnology and the Commercialization of Molecular
Biology, 1974-1980, 92 ISIS 541, 569–70 & n.77 (2001); Wysocki, supra note 7, at A1.
Amy Kapczynski has argued that open licensing may be profitable for universities more
generally, not just with enabling technologies. See Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing
Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1088–89 (2005). I am less persuaded by this broader
argument.
51
For examples of such approaches, including Stanford’s and WARF’s, see Ritchie de
Larena, supra note 8, at 1420.
52
Stanford University has a relatively enlightened university technology transfer policy
that uses all of these intermediate mechanisms. Conversations with Linda Chao, Senior
Licensing Associate, Stanford Office of Technology Licensing, Stanford, Cal. (May
2006). Stanford’s official policy is available at http://otl.stanford.edu/inventors/
resources/otlandinvent.html.
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comers.53 Open source software development is one example, but
hardly the only one.54
If we are to achieve the goal of maximizing the social benefit
of a university invention to society, universities must first
recognize their proper role in society and how that role affects
patent policies. An important first step in that education process is
to end the isolation of university technology transfer or licensing
offices from the rest of the university.55 If universities treat
licensing offices as revenue generation devices, evaluated on how
much money they bring in each quarter, the result will be
university patent policies that are not always or even often
consonant with the ultimate public interest.56 The problem is even
worse if universities outsource their technology transfer functions
altogether to private licensing shops.57 If a university thinks of its
role in society as a whole, if it treats patent licensing as one aspect
of a broader technology transfer policy, it can and should develop

53

For a general argument along these lines, see generally Brett M. Frischmann, An
Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917
(2005). See, e.g., Stanford Office of Technology Licensing Policies,
http://otl.stanford.edu/inventors/policies.html#research (“Inventors may place their
inventions in the public domain if they believe that would be in the best interest of
technology transfer.”). And some have argued for open licensing of university
pharmaceutical inventions in the developing world. See, e.g., Kapczynski supra note 50,
at 1031. By contrast, Arti Rai documents the difficulties scientists have had persuading
universities to build an open source model for collaborative biotechnology research. See
Arti K. Rai, “Open and Collaborative” Biomedical Research: Theory and Evidence, 29,
35–36 (2005) (working paper), available at http://pascal.case.unibz.it/retrieve/2436/
rai.pdf.
54
For a useful step in this regard, see generally Leonard Lynn & Hal Salzman,
Collaborative Advantage, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH., Summer 2006, at 74, available at
http://www.kauffman.org/pdf/collaborative_advantage_12_05.pdf (setting out principles
agreed to by corporations and several major universities for making software inventions
freely available).
55
For a discussion of the various ways in which university technology transfer offices
are organized today, see Ritchie de Larena, supra note 8, at 1413.
56
See id. at 1416–17 (“One point that most technology-transfer managers agree upon is
that it is not wise to judge a university’s technology-transfer office solely on licensing
income.”).
57
For example, the University of Colorado has outsourced much of its patent licensing
to Competitive Technologies Inc.
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more enlightened policies. A number of universities have taken
significant steps in this regard,58 but more remains to be done.
B. Legal Constraints on Unenlightened Universities
If universities don’t develop such policies voluntarily, society
may have other mechanisms to ensure that university patents don’t
impede innovation. Federal funding agencies can play a role. The
National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) has, at various times in the
past, imposed mandates requiring universities to grant certain types
of licenses to their work.59 The Bayh-Dole Act permits the
government to exercise “march-in rights,” requiring that particular
patents be licensed on non-exclusive terms,60 though those rights
have not been used, and may prove difficult to use.61 Some have
even suggested that publicly funded research should be subject to
compulsory license.62 Alternatively, as universities become more
and more vulnerable to patent infringement suits themselves,63
private sector patent owners may be able to create some of the
symmetry that drives cross-licenses in industries like
semiconductors by obtaining patents that universities infringe and
threatening to assert them against any university who sues them for
patent infringement.64 These measures might turn out to be
necessary, but I’d like to see us try first to solve the problem not by
imposing a solution, but by encouraging universities to take the
first step in recognizing their social responsibility associated with
their patents.

58
For discussion, see Geertrui Van Overwalle, Reconciling Patent Policies with the
University Mission, 13 ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 231, 237–38 (2006) (offering suggested
policies).
59
See Wysocki, supra note 7, at A1 (noting that the NIH required Professor Axel at
Columbia University to license his fundamental patents on methods of inserting genes
into cells nonexclusively and at a reasonable royalty).
60
35 U.S.C. § 209 (2000).
61
See Mireles, supra note 34, at 1138 (making this argument).
62
See, e.g., Ron A. Bouchard, Balancing Public and Private Interests in the
Commercialization of Publicly Funded Medical Research: Is There a Role for
Compulsory Government Royalty Fees?, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 120, 125–26 (2007).
63
See, e.g., Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
64
There may be practical reasons why this last option is unlikely, however. See Rowe,
supra note 16, at 940–44.
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C. Broader Lessons: Who Is a Patent Troll?
Finally, I think we can learn something about the raging debate
over who’s a patent troll and what to do about trolls by looking at
university patents. Universities are non-practicing entities. They
share some characteristics with trolls, at least if the term is broadly
defined,65 but they are not trolls. Asking what distinguishes
universities from trolls can actually help us figure out what
concerns us about trolls. One of the differences between
universities and private licensing shops is that universities are, by
and large, not engaged in hiding the ball, waiting until people have
developed an industry and then popping up and demanding a
disproportionate share of royalties based on irreversible
investments.66 There are occasional examples of that,67 and they
should be condemned, but it’s not the ordinary case with a
university license. Instead, most university licenses have a major
technology transfer component. A nonexclusive patent license is
effectively nothing more than forbearance from suit in exchange
for money.68 By contrast, most university licenses give the
licensee not just the right to avoid a lawsuit, but also provide
valuable know-how. Indeed, many also involve continued work by
the inventor, particularly if the license is to a start-up and is
exclusive. That sort of technology transfer is something we want
to encourage for reasons Rob Merges has explained: granting IP
rights allows companies not to be constrained by a particular
definition of the firm and forced do all of our innovation in house.
It allows us to have markets for technology.69 Markets for
technology contribute more to society than markets for litigation

65

Cf. James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of
the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 199 (2006)
(“under Detkin’s definition, the U.S. government and government-funded research
universities become trolls . . .”).
66
On this problem, see Lemley, Ten Things, supra note 3; Lemley & Shapiro, supra
note 5.
67
For a discussion of a submarine patent strategy employed by Columbia University,
see Ritchie de Larena, supra note 8, at 1417–18.
68
See, e.g., Intell. Prop. Dev., Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, 248 F.3d 1333, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (describing a nonexclusive license as nothing more than a “covenant not to sue”).
69
See Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1477, 1513–19 (2005).
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rights.70 University patent owners aren’t trolls in my view when
they contribute previously unknown technology to society, rather
than just imposing costs on others by obtaining and asserting legal
rights over inventions independently developed by others.71
In the abstract, I think we could successfully define patent
trolls by distinguishing cases in which non-manufacturing entities
license only the right not to be sued from cases in which the patent
owner actually engages in technology transfer. But that’s only in
the abstract. Were a court ever to announce such a definition, it
would immediately be gamed. All true trolls would start passing
on some mandatory know-how along with their patent licenses in
order to avoid being categorized as trolls.
What we ought to do instead is abandon the search for a group
of individual companies to define as trolls. We don’t need to focus
on identifying bad actors. In my view, troll is as troll does.
Universities will sometimes be bad actors. Nonmanufacturing
patent owners will sometimes be bad actors. Manufacturing patent
owners will sometimes be bad actors. Instead of singling out bad
actors, we should focus on the bad acts and the laws that make
them possible. We will solve the troll problem not by hunting
down and eliminating trolls, but by hunting down and eliminating
the many legal rules that facilitate the capture by patent owners of
a disproportionate share of an irreversible investment. And that
process is well underway. We should encourage reform of current
continuation practice, which allows patent owners to hide the true
nature of their invention until late in the process and facilitates
their later claiming to have invented something they did not.72 We
70

See generally ASHISH ARORA ET AL., MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY (2001) (noting the
contributions of technology markets).
71
Indeed, Jerry and Marie Thursby argue that the continued role of the inventor in
technology transfer is critical to the success of university licenses. Jerry G. Thursby &
Marie C. Thursby, Are Faculty Critical? Their Role in University-Industry Licensing
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W9991, 2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=450892.
72
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent
Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 71–84 (2004). The PTO issued regulations that
would limit applicants to three continuations (plus an unlimited number of divisionals) as
a matter of right, a rule that would make a very modest step towards solving the problem.
United States Patent & Trademark Office, Changes to Practice for Continued
Examination Filings, Patent Applications Containing Patently Indistinct Claims, and
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should focus on reform of the willfulness doctrine, under which a
patent owner can get treble damages from an independent inventor
merely by telling them about the patent and which has the perverse
effect of causing people to try to avoid learning of patents.73 We
should focus on reform of royalty calculation rules that give a
disproportionate award of damages to patent owners in component
industries because they don’t adequately take account of the
contributions of other aspects of the invention.74 And we should
take the opportunity presented by the Supreme Court’s eBay
decision75 to craft intelligent standards for deciding when to grant
injunctive relief. If we change the rules that make patent hold-up
such an attractive revenue generator, we won’t have to worry about
the question of whether or not universities—or anyone else—are
patent trolls. We will have eliminated the problem of opportunistic
behavior that interferes with innovation, something we want to
stop regardless of what we call it.

Examination of Claims in Patent Applications; Final Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 46716 (Aug. 21,
2007). At this writing it is far from clear that even these watered-down rules will go into
effect, however; they are currently enjoined. Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 652 (E.D.
Va. 2007).
73
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law’s Willfulness
Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085 (2003) (identifying this problem and proposing
changes to deal with it). The Patent Reform Act, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005),
pending at this writing, would make it much more difficult to plead willfulness. And the
Federal Circuit took a significant step towards reducing the problem in In re Seagate
Technology, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
74
See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 5; Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits
From Reasonable Royalties (2008) (working paper).
75
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, 547 U.S. 946 (2006).

